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Abstract
This paper provides a simple explanation for why some minority groups are economically
successful, despite being subject to government-mandated discriminatory policies. We study
an economy with private and public sectors in which workers invest in imperfectly observable
skills that are important to the private sector but not to the public sector. A law allows native
majority workers to be employed in the public sector with positive probability while excluding
the minority from it. We show that even when the public sector oﬀers the highest wage rate, it
is still possible that the discriminated group is, on average, economically more successful. The
reason is that the preferential policy lowers the majority’s incentive to invest in imperfectly
observable skills by exacerbating the informational free riding problem in the private sector
labor market.
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Government-mandated discrimination of ethnic or religious groups is a common phenomenon
in many places around the world. The most well-known examples are probably the Jim Crow
laws in the United States, the South African apartheid system, and the more modest preferential
treatment of Blacks during the era of aﬃrmative action in the United States. Sowell (1990) also
documents numerous less well-known examples of such policies in other parts of the world. In
Malaysia after independence, Chinese were not allowed to hold government positions during the
so-called “Malaysianization” movement. The newly independent Philippines in 1954 passed the
Retail Trade Act banning the Chinese from retail trade, and also prohibited Chinese to work in the
public sector during the Philipinization movement (Juan 1996, Page 14). In other Southeast Asian
countries, Chinese have continuously been the subject of oﬃcial discrimination ranging from minor
harassments, such as special taxes for signs written in Chinese, to more signiﬁcant measures such
as bans from a wide range of professions, discriminatory taxation, and bans against Chinese-owned
retail and trade (see Purcell 1965). In both middle-age and modern Europe the Jews were heavily
restricted and persecuted in their professional endeavors.
While Blacks in the United States and South Africa have suﬀered dearly from the discriminatory
policies, preferential policies do not necessarily make the preferred groups perform better econom-
ically than the discriminated groups. According to Sowell (1990, P. 51), in Malaysia, “[A]mong
private sector doctors, engineers, accountants, architects, and lawyers, the Chinese continued to
outnumber the Malays absolutely in 1984, after more than a decade of preferential policies.” In fact,
the Malay median income has remained a constant fraction (around 50%) of the Chinese median
income (Sowell 1990, P. 50). In most of the Southeast Asia, the Chinese minority is signiﬁcantly
wealthier than the natives, and in fact, is the economically dominant group. And Jews, despite
economic restrictions and political persecutions in Europe, continued to prosper (Sowell 1996, P.
240).
Why, in spite of the discriminatory policies, are the overseas Chinese and Jews more prosperous
than the groups that are preferentially treated by government mandates? At least for the Chinese,
an obvious explanation is that immigrants are a selective sample of individuals. Using U.S. data,
Borjas (1987, 1994) found that immigrant earnings “overtake” that of native workers within ﬁfteen
years after controlling for socioeconomic characteristics. Since there seems to be no particular reason
for immigrants to accumulate more human capital than native workers, this evidence suggests that
immigrants are more “able” and “diligent”. While it is certainly possible that immigrants in the
U . S .a r em o r el i k e l yt oh a v et h e s ep r o d u c t i v et r a i t s ,i td o e sn o ts e e mt ob et h ec a s ef o rC h i n e s e
immigrants to Malaysia. Again according to Sowell (1990, P. 46), the Chinese immigrants to
1Malaysia were “initially largely illiterate as well as destitute,” while the education for Malays were
provided for free by the colonial government.
Another rationale is “cultural diﬀerences” between groups. The view that cultural diﬀerences
are important is often supported by appeal to the large persistence in relative performance between
diﬀerent ethnic groups among second and third generation immigrants (see Borjas 1994). Combined
with the perception (supported by, e.g., Becker and Tomes 1976) that there is a rather small
correlation between acquired skills of parents and children, this suggests that groups somehow
diﬀer, which is attributed to cultural diﬀerences. In recent work, Landa (1999) suggest a theory
of Chinese merchant success, based on the premise that the Confucian code of ethics facilitate
cooperation.
While it is convenient to attribute the success of overseas Chinese and Jews to their unique
culture, we believe that culture is not exogenous. Our view is therefore that this explanation
is at best incomplete, unless cultural diﬀerences are explained as an equilibrium phenomenon.
Moreover, there are several direct challenges to this sort of explanation for the success of ethnic
Chinese. First, the same Confucian heritage was blamed for the backwardness of China in the
1950s (see, e.g., Needham 1956). Second, according to Juan (1996, Page 15), in the Philippines
and other Southeast Asian countries, the ethnic Chinese economy achieved rapid growth during
the 1970s, at the same time as the propagation of Chinese language and culture started on its swift
trend downwards.
In this paper, we provide a simple model of the incentive eﬀects of discriminatory policies. In a
nutshell, we show that, in an economy with imperfect information, discriminatory policies, usually
viewed as obstacles, may serve as a useful device to overcome an informational free riding problem
among the members of the discriminated group. Hence, government-mandated discrimination could
actually be the reason for, rather than an obstacle to, economic success.
We study an economy with two sectors, a public sector and a private sector. In the private
sector, ﬁrms compete (by posting wages) for workers who makes a binary skill investment prior
to entering the labor market. A worker has high productivity if she has the requisite skills and
low otherwise, but skills are not directly observable to the ﬁrms. Instead, ﬁrms must rely on
informative, but noisy, signals to make inference about workers. This leads to an informational
free riding problem (see Fang 2001 and Norman 2000). The free riding problem arises because the
ﬁrms’ perception of the fraction of skilled workers in the population is a public good.
In contrast, we assume that the skill investment is not important for performance in the public
sector. Moreover, the public sector pays higher wages than those in the private sector.1 Obviously,
1It is not necessary for our results that the public sector is better paid than all jobs in the private sector. We
2if all native majority workers could be given a public sector job, then the majority would certainly
do better than the discriminated minority. But, due to the natural capacity constraints, it seems
reasonable to think that public sector jobs are rationed, which we assume in our analysis.
We show that, if a government-mandated preferential policy gives the native majority a positive
probability of obtaining public sector jobs, while the minority is completely excluded, it is possible
that the minority is, on average, economically more successful than the majority. The intuition
is as follows: when the minority is excluded from the public sector, the direct eﬀe c ti st h a tt h e y
suﬀe ral o s sd u et ot h ew a g ed i ﬀerential between public and private sector jobs. However, the
exclusion also creates better incentives to invest in skills valuable in the private sector by partially
alleviating the informational free riding problem among the group members. The latter, indirect
equilibrium eﬀect, may dominate the direct eﬀect. Moreover, we show that the magnitude of the
wealth diﬀerentials that can be generated by the model are potentially substantial.
The main focus of our paper is to provide an alternative explanation for the success of heavily
discriminated minority groups, such as the Chinese in Southeast Asia and Jews in Europe. But the
conditions that we need for the discriminated minorities to be more successful than the preferred
majority also provides us with a possible explanation for the economic hardship encountered by
some discriminated minorities. We ﬁnd that the extent to which government-mandated discrimi-
natory policy applies is most crucial: Exclusion from a small segment of the labor market may help
the minority, whereas broader measures are likely to harm (see Section 5).
Our model is most closely related to models of statistical discrimination following the seminal
contributions by Arrow (1973), Phelps (1972) and more recently, Coate and Loury (1993). This
literature tries to understand how discrimination can arise as an equilibrium phenomenon, and
this is usually rationalized in models with multiple equilibria. In contrast, discrimination is by
government mandate in our paper, and while informational externalities similar to those in models
of statistical discrimination are crucial for our results, multiplicity of equilibria is not central to our
analysis.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic economic
environment; Section 3 analyzes the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of the model; Section
4 shows that the indirect eﬀects of discriminatory policies on the workers’ incentives to invest
in skills in the private labor market may dominate the direct eﬀects, and make the discriminated
minority economically more successful than the preferred majority; Section 5 demonstrates that the
magnitude of the economic force we highlight in this paper can be substantial; Section 6 discusses
make the assumption in the belief that it is most realistic that the politically dominant group excludes minorities
from the most attractive professions.
3two implications of the model and their supporting evidence and ﬁnally Section 7 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
The model is adapted from Coate and Loury (1992) with two main departures: ﬁrst, we endo-
genize the wage oﬀers; second, we introduce a public sector that allows us to investigate the eﬀects
of government-mandated discriminatory policy.
A. The Private and Public Sectors
Consider an economy with two sectors, called respectively the private and the public sector.
The private sector consists of two (or more) competitive ﬁrms, indexed by i =1 ,2. Firms are risk
neutral and maximize expected proﬁts, and are endowed with a technology that is complementary
to workers’ skills. A skilled worker can produce β > 0 units of output while an unskilled one will,
by normalization, produce 0.
The public sector oﬀers a ﬁxed wage g to any worker who is hired, but there is rationing of
public sector jobs. If applying, the probability of getting hired is ρ ∈ [0,1], where ρ is treated as
exogenous in our analysis.2 Workers who apply for but are unsuccessful in obtaining public sector
employment can return to and obtain a job in the private sector without waiting.
B. Workers
There is a continuum of workers with unit mass in the economy. Workers are heterogeneous in
their costs of acquiring the requisite skills for the operation of the ﬁrms’ technology, denoted by
c, which is private information for the worker. In the population, c is distributed according to a
continuous cumulative distribution J (·) with support [c,c].
Workers are risk neutral and do not care directly about whether they work in the public or
private sector. If a worker of cost type c receives wage w, her payoﬀ is w−c if she invests in skills,
and w if she does not invest.
C. Timing of Events and Information Structure
It is useful to divide the events in this economy into four stages that we now detail. The timing
of events is summarized in Figure 1.
2In a more realistic setup, one can imagine that there is a limited number of public sector vacancies and the
probability of being employed in the public sector equals to the ratio of the vacancy and the number of applicants.
The main insight of this paper is robust to such a formulation. In fact, in our leading example, every worker wants












Figure 1: Timing of The Events
In the ﬁrst stage, each worker c ∈ [c,c] decides whether to invest in the skills. This binary
decision is denoted by s ∈ {0,1} where s =0stands for no skill investment and s =1for skill
acquisition. If a worker chooses s =1 , we say that she becomes qualiﬁed and hence she can produce
β units of output in the private sector; otherwise she is unqualiﬁed and will produce 0. We write
the skill acquisition proﬁle as S :[ c,c] → {0,1}.
It is important that skill acquisitions are not perfectly observed by the ﬁrms. However, in the
second stage, the worker and the ﬁrms observe a noisy signal θ ∈ {h,l} ≡ Θ about the worker’s
skill acquisition decision.3 We assume that a high signal h (and a low signal l, respectively) reveals
aq u a l i ﬁed (an unqualiﬁed, respectively) worker correctly with probability p. That is,
Pr[θ = h|s =1 ]=P r[ θ = l|s =0 ]=p
where, without further loss of generality, p>1/2.
In the third stage, after observing the noisy signal θ, the worker decides whether to apply for the
public sector job. If applying, she is accepted for employment in the public sector with probability
ρ.
If she did not get employed in the public sector, she will, in the fourth stage, return to the
private sector, where ﬁrms compete for her services by posting wage oﬀers wi : Θ → R+. After
observing the wage oﬀers, she decides which ﬁrm to work for, clearing the private sector labor
market.
The primitives of the economy are summarized in Table 1. For notational ease, we let e =
(J,β,g,ρ,p) denote a generic economy and the set of all admissible economies be denoted by E.
D. Discussion of the Assumptions
3Models of statistical discrimination usually assume that signals are distributed according to a continuous density
fq if the worker invests in skills and fu if she does not, and that fq/fu satisﬁes the strict monotone likelihood ratio
property. We could also follow this route, but prefer the binary formulation for its simplicity.
5J : Continuous CDF of the skill investment costs
β : Productivity of skilled workers, β > 0
g : Wage rate in the public sector, g>0
ρ : Probability of public sector jobs if one applies
p : Precision of the noisy signals, p>1/2.
Table 1: Primitives of the Economy.
In this section we discuss some of the assumptions:
• Output is not contractible in our model. The informational externality that is driving our
results would disappear if workers could be made residual claimants on output, so this as-
sumption is important. One way to justify this is if workers are engaged in team production
and only the aggregate, but not the individual, output can be observed by the ﬁrm.
• The informational externality would also disappear if the workers can access the production
technology. In our model we rule this out by assuming that only the ﬁrms have access to
the production technology. One way to justify such an assumption would be to appeal to
“entrepreneurial ability” as necessary for successful operation of a ﬁrm and identify ﬁrms
with entrepreneurs. Alternatively, one could imagine that there is a minimum eﬃcient scale
of production or that the operation of the technology also requires some technical know-how
that only the ﬁr m sh a v ea c c e s st o .
• We assume that if a worker is unsuccessful in obtaining public sector employment, she can
immediately return to the private sector to ﬁnd a job. Moreover, since the noisy signal is
realized before public sector jobs are allocated, workers know exactly what wage they would
get in the private sector. These assumptions are made in order not to build in any disguised
“matching costs” in the public sector. In other words, our choice of timing guarantees that
a worker has nothing to loose from applying to the public sector if the wage is higher there
than the wage she would get in the private sector.
• Both the public sector wage g and the probability of obtaining public sector employment ρ
are independent of θ. These extreme assumptions are made so that our main idea can be
conveyed in the simplest possible fashion. The results are robust to alternative assumptions
as long as “luck” is more important in the public sector than in the private sector.
63 Equilibrium
A Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (PBNE) of the economy consists of a skill acquisition
proﬁle S (·), job application and oﬀer acceptance decisions by the workers, together with ﬁrm wage
oﬀer schedules wi (·), such that every player optimizes against other players’ strategy proﬁle for a
consistent belief system.4
We ﬁrst analyze the equilibrium wage oﬀers in the fourth stage. A private ﬁrm observing a
worker with a signal θ ∈ {h,l} must form a belief about the probability that the worker is qualiﬁed.
Suppose that at the end of the ﬁrst stage, a proportion π of the population is qualiﬁed. Then in
the second stage, a total measure pπ +( 1− p)(1− π) of workers receive signal h, among which
am e a s u r epπ is qualiﬁed and a measure (1 − p)(1− π) is unqualiﬁed. Similarly, a total measure
(1 − p)π + p(1 − π) of workers receive signal l, among which a measure (1 − p)π is qualiﬁed and
am e a s u r ep(1 − π) is unqualiﬁed.
In the third stage, each worker observes her signal. In equilibrium, all workers with the same
signals must make identical decisions about whether or not to apply for public sector employment
regardless of whether they are qualiﬁed or not (unless they are indiﬀerent, in which case a decision
independent of qualiﬁc a t i o n si ss t i l lo p t i m a l ) .T h i si st r u eb e c a u s et h ec o n t i n u a t i o np a y o ﬀ in the
fourth stage does not depend on the skills. Hence, we conclude that, in the fourth stage, the
proportion of qualiﬁed workers among workers with signal θ is unaﬀected by their public sector job
a p p l i c a t i o nd e c i s i o ni nt h et h i r ds t a g e ,e v e nt h o u g ht h et o t a lm a s so fw o r k e r sw i t hs i g n a lθ will be
aﬀected.
Therefore, if the proportion of qualiﬁed workers in the population at the end of the ﬁrst stage
is π, then in the fourth stage, when a ﬁrm sees a worker with a signal θ, its posterior belief that
this worker is qualiﬁed, denoted by Pr[s =1 |θ;π] where θ ∈ {h,l}, is given by
Pr[s =1 |θ = h;π]=
pπ
pπ +( 1− p)(1− π)
Pr[s =1 |θ = l;π]=
(1 − p)π
(1 − p)π + p(1 − π)
. (1)
Note that in (1), π serves as the prior in the application of Bayes’ rule. Standard arguments show
that the “Bertrand”-type competition between ﬁrms for the workers implies that in the fourth
stage, each worker will be oﬀered a wage equal to her expected productivity in equilibrium (see,
e.g., Moro and Norman 2001). Hence, in the fourth stage, the equilibrium wage for workers with
4Due to the noise in the signal, there are no oﬀ-the-equilibrium path histories for the ﬁr m st oo b s e r v e ,s ob e l i e f s
are fully determined by Bayesian updating. The only place where “perfectness” enters the analysis is that workers
in the private sector choose ﬁrms optimally after any history of play.
7signal θ ∈ {h,l} w h e nt h ep r o p o r t i o no fq u a l i ﬁed workers in the population is π, denoted by wθ (π),
is
wh (π)=β Pr[s =1 |θ = h;π]=
βpπ
pπ +( 1− p)(1− π)
wl (π)=β Pr[s =1 |θ = l;π]=
β(1 − p)π
(1 − p)π + p(1 − π)
. (2)
The public sector job application decision in the third stage is now easy to analyze. A worker
with signal θ applies to the public sector job if wθ (π) <gand does not apply if wθ (π) >g .If
wθ (π)=g, then she is indiﬀerent and we break ties by assuming that indiﬀerent workers apply for
the public sector jobs. Note that both wh (·) and wl (·) in (2) are monotonically increasing in π.
By deﬁning ˆ πθ as the solution to wθ (ˆ πθ)=g for θ = h,l, which are given by
ˆ πh =
g(1 − p)
g(1 − p)+p(β − g)
ˆ πl =
gp
gp+( 1− p)(β − g)
, (3)
it then follows that a worker with signal θ applies for a public sector job if and if π ≤ ˆ πθ.
A worker’s incentive to acquire skills in the ﬁrst stage comes from the subsequent expected wage
diﬀerential between a qualiﬁe da n da nu n q u a l i ﬁed worker. The wage diﬀerential arises because
qualiﬁed workers are more likely to draw high signals. Denote the expected wage, before the signal
is realized, for a qualiﬁed and an unqualiﬁed worker, respectively by W1 (π,ρ) and W0 (π,ρ), where
π is the fraction of qualiﬁed workers in the population and ρ is the probability of being assigned a
job in the public sector if one applies. They are given by
W1 (π,ρ)=p · max{wh (π),ρg +( 1− ρ)wh (π)}
+(1 − p) · max{wl (π),ρg +(1− ρ)wl (π)}
W0 (π,ρ)=( 1 − p) · max{wh (π),ρg +( 1− ρ)wh (π)}
+p · max{wl (π),ρg +( 1− ρ)wl (π)}, (4)
where the max operator in (4) represents the workers’ optimal decision of whether or not to apply
for a public sector job. The incentive to invest, or, the gain in expected wage from skill investment
in the ﬁrst stage, denoted by I (π,ρ),i st h u sg i v e nb y
I (π,ρ)=W1 (π,ρ) − W0 (π,ρ)
=( 2 p − 1){(1 − ρ)[wh (π) − wl (π)] + ρ[max{wh (π),g} − max{wl (π),g}]}. (5)














Figure 2: An Illustration of the Function I (π,ρ) for ρ =0and ρ = .5.





(2p − 1)(1 − ρ)[wh (π) − wl (π)] if 0 ≤ π < ˆ πh
(2p − 1){(1 − ρ)[wh (π) − wl (π)] + ρ[wh(π) − g]} if ˆ πh ≤ π < ˆ πl
(2p − 1)[wh(π) − wl (π)] if ˆ πl ≤ π ≤ 1.
(6)
Figure 2 graphically illustrates the function I (π,ρ) for ρ =0and ρ = .5.
T h ef a c tt h a taw o r k e r ’ si n c e n t i v e sf o rt h es k i l li n v e s t m e n ti saf u n c t i o no fπ, the proportion
of qualiﬁed workers in the population, is the source of informational free riding. The reason that
workers will free ride is obvious: the ﬁrms’ perception about the proportion of qualiﬁed workers in
the population, which serves as the prior in the Bayesian updating, is a public good, (see Fang 2001
for similar discussions). This informational free riding problem is best illustrated by an extreme
case. Suppose that every worker in the economy invests in skills. Then, regardless what signal
the ﬁrms observe, every worker is paid β, so there is no incentive to acquire skills at all, that is,
I (1,ρ)=0 .
The incentive to invest depends also on ρ, the probability of public sector employment, which is
the reason for a government-mandated preferential (or discriminatory) policy in the public sector
to matter for the private sector labor market in our model. Indeed, a higher probability of public







−(2p − 1)[wh (π) − wl (π)] < 0 if π < ˆ πh
(2p − 1)[wl (π) − g] < 0 if ˆ πh ≤ π < ˆ πl
0 otherwise.
(7)
The intuition is simple: the public sector does not give any edge to qualiﬁed workers over unqualiﬁed
workers.
It is also easy to see that the function I (·,ρ) is continuous in π, and satisfy
I (0,ρ)=I (1,ρ)=0 .
The reason is that the signal is useless when everyone makes the same investment decision. That
is, if the perception is that no one (everyone) in the population is qualiﬁed, then the ﬁrms will oﬀer
aw a g ee q u a lt o0 (β) to all workers regardless of their signals, implying that there is no advantage
to be qualiﬁed.
Using the investment incentives characterized in (6) it is obvious that, in the ﬁrst stage, a
worker with cost c will invest in skills if and only if c ≤ I (π,ρ). A PBNE of the economy is thus
fully characterized by a fraction of investors π∗ that solves
π∗ = J (I (π∗;ρ)) (8)
Proposition 1 There exists at least one PBNE for any economy e ∈ E.
Proof. Since J is a continuous CDF and for every ρ ∈ [0,1], the map J ◦ I :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] is
continuous. The existence of ﬁxed points follows from the intermediate value theorem.
We let Ω(e) denote the set of ﬁxed points for economy e. It is easy to see that 0 ∈ Ω(e) for
every e with c ≥ 0, that is there is a trivial equilibrium whenever the investment is costly for all
agents. We say that an economy e admits non-trivial equilibria if there exist positive elements in
Ω(e) and we will denote the set of non-trivial equilibria of economy e by Ω+ (e).
4 Exclusion from the Public Sector May Be Beneﬁcial
Suppose that there are two ethnic groups in the economy. A government-mandated discrimina-
tory policy excludes one group from public sector employment (that is, ρ is set to 0), while workers
from the other group are employed in the public sector with positive probability. This section
demonstrates that the discriminated group nevertheless may be economically more successful than
the preferred group.
10The main insight is best conveyed in a simple example. We will make several parametric
restrictions below and for the rest of this section we assume that the investment cost c is uniformly
distributed on the interval [0,1].
Assumption 1. J is the CDF of Uniform [0,1].
A. Equilibrium with ρ =0
We ﬁrst analyze the equilibrium outcomes for the discriminated group. From (5) the incentive
to invest when ρ =0can be re-written as
I (π,0) = (2p − 1)[wh (π) − wl (π)]. (9)
Proposition 2 The function I (·,0) is strictly concave in π, with maximum obtained at π =1 /2.
Proof. By a direct calculation we obtain
∂I (π,0)
∂π





























Moreover, with simple algebra, we have
∂2I (π,0)











where Z is some positive term. The above term is negative since H0 (π) > 0,a n dL0 (π) < 0.
Under Assumption 1, the equilibrium condition (8) simpliﬁes to
I (π,0) = π. (11)
Obviously 0 ∈ Ω(e). The following proposition establishes the necessary and suﬃcient condition
for unique non-trivial equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Under Assumption 1, when ρ =0 , the necessary and suﬃcient condition for the





11Proof. From Proposition 2, we know that I (·,0) is strictly concave in π, hence I (π,0) crosses the
45
◦
line at most twice. Since 0 is already a ﬁxed point, there is at most one non-trivial equilibrium.








Proposition 3 is intuitive. To induce the workers to invest in skills, the wage diﬀerential, which
depends on the productivity of a qualiﬁed β and the precision of the signal p,h a st ob es u ﬃcient
large. The threshold p(1 − p)/(2p − 1)
2 is decreasing in the precision of the noisy signals p (recall
that p>1/2). Indeed when the signal is perfect, when p =1 , any economy with positive β will
admit a non-trivial equilibrium.
We will henceforth focus on non-trivial equilibrium whenever it exists.5
Next, we impose a restriction on the parameters that simpliﬁes the analysis tremendously.
Assumption 2. (2p − 1)2β =1 /2.
This assumption is only for algebraic convenience. As shown in Section 4.D, we can relax this
assumption, but the cost of doing so is that our main results can only be demonstrated numerically
rather than analytically. Assumption 2 is satisﬁed by a manifold of economies in E,f o re x a m p l e ,i t
is satisﬁed by p =2 /3 and β =9 /2.
Under Assumption 2, the unique non-trivial equilibrium with ρ =0is given by Ω+ (0) = 1/2 (by
substitution into (9) one can check that I (1/2,0) = (2p − 1)
2 β). The reason that this simpliﬁes
the analysis is that the restriction makes sure that the equilibrium is at the point where incentives
are maximized (see Proposition 2), so ∂I (1/2,0)/∂π =0 , w h i c hi nt u r nm a k e st h ec o m p a r a t i v e
statics easier to handle.
B. Equilibrium with ρ > 0: Local Analysis
In this section, we maintain Assumptions 1 and 2, and analyze the non-trivial equilibrium of
the economy when ρ , the probability of public sector jobs, is positive. To begin with we consider
marginal eﬀects, applicable for ρ suﬃciently close to 0.
When ρ =0 , workers with signal h receive wage pβ and those with signal l receives (1 − p)β
in the non-trivial equilibrium, which can be seen from plugging in π =1 /2 into (2). To make our
5The trivial equilibrium exists because c =0in the example. If c can take on negative values, albeit with arbitrarily
small probability, then the trivial equilibrium can be eliminated, justifying the selection.
12case most interesting, we assume that the wage rate in the public sector is higher than pβ, that is,
wages in the public sector is higher than those in the private sector.
Assumption 3. g>p β.
Given Assumption 3, one can imagine that a government controlled by the political majority
notes that the public sector pays higher wages and is under their control, and mandates a preferential
policy in favor of the politically inﬂuential group. That is, we now assume that the government
sets the probability of public sector jobs to be 0 for the discriminated group and set it to be ρ > 0
for the preferred group.
We ﬁrst show that the proportion of qualiﬁed workers in the preferred group will be less than
that in the discriminated group.
Proposition 4 Consider any economy e ∈ E satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2. For any ρ > 0, then
the proportion of qualiﬁed workers in any non-trivial equilibrium is less than 1/2.
Proof. From (7), we know that for all π > 1/2, if ρ > 0, then I (π,ρ) <I(π,0). But since the
unique non-trivial equilibrium when ρ =0is at π =1 /2, it must be that for π > 1/2,I(π,0) < π.
Hence for all π > 1/2, I (π,ρ) < π if ρ > 0.
Note that Assumption 3 is not required for Proposition 4. Now we establish the necessary and
suﬃcient condition for the existence of non-trivial equilibrium when ρ > 0:
Proposition 5 Under Assumptions 1-3, if ρ > 0, then there exists a unique non-trivial equilibrium
if and only if ρ < 1 − 2p(1 − p).
Proof. Under Assumption 3, ˆ πh as deﬁned in (3) is larger than 1/2. Hence for all π ≤ 1/2, the
investment incentive function in (6) is given by
I (π,ρ)=( 2 p − 1)(1 − ρ)[wh (π) − wl (π)] = (1 − ρ)I (π,0).
From Proposition 4, any non-trivial equilibria must lie in the interval (0,1/2] where ρ > 0. Unique-
ness follows from the strict concavity of I (·,ρ) in the interval (0,1/2]. Non-trivial equilibrium exists










where the last equality follows from Assumption 2. Hence ∂I (0,ρ)/∂π > 0 if and only if ρ <
1 − 2p(1 − p).
13Our focus in this section is on how the non-trivial equilibrium depends on ρ, we will then, with
some abuse of notation, write the unique non-trivial equilibrium if it exists, when the probability
of public sector jobs is ρ, as Ω+ (ρ).
Now we consider the values of ρ in a neighborhood ε of 0. If ε is suﬃciently small, a unique










where the second equality follows from (6) since any non-trivial equilibrium with ρ > 0 satisﬁes
Ω+ (ρ) ≤ 1/2 (Proposition 5), and Assumption 3 implies that ˆ πh > 1/2. That is, in the range
of possible equilibrium proportions of qualiﬁed workers, g is high enough so that everyone applies
for public sector employment, implying that the incentive to invest is the same as the incentive















Under Assumption 2, Ω+ (0) = 1/2 and since ∂I (1/2,0)/∂π =0( T h i si st h em a i na l g e b r a i c











For any ρ within a small neighborhood of 0, the expected wage in the unique non-trivial equilibrium
for a qualiﬁe da n da nu n q u a l i ﬁed worker before the test signal is realized, W1 (Ω+ (ρ),ρ) and






























We now totally diﬀerentiating W1 (Ω+ (ρ),ρ) and W0 (Ω+ (ρ),ρ) with respect to ρ and evaluate
them at ρ =0 . We can obtain, after some simpliﬁcations,
dW1 (Ω+ (ρ),ρ)
dρ
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
ρ=0
=












Indirect Eﬀect z }| {
(1 − ρ)
d[pwh (Ω+(ρ)) + (1 − p)wl (Ω+(ρ))]
dρ
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
ρ=0
.






=4 p(1 − p)β,
14we can, after using (14), obtain:
dW1 (Ω+ (ρ),ρ)
dρ
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
ρ=0
=
Direct Eﬀects z }| { n
g −
h





Indirect Eﬀect z }| {
−2p(1 − p)β = g − β. (16)
Similarly, we can get
dW0 (Ω+ (ρ),ρ)
dρ
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
ρ=0
= g − 4p(1 − p)β. (17)
Since 4p(1 − p) < 1, together with our maintained Assumption 3, g>p β, we have proved the
following proposition:
Proposition 6 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, if moreover pβ <g<4p(1 − p)β, then the expected
wage of both qualiﬁed and unqualiﬁed workers when ρ is positive but small are lower than those
when ρ =0 .
The intuition for Proposition 6 is as follows. When the government marginally increases ρ from
0, there are two direct eﬀects: ﬁrst, the group will now have a higher degree of access to a higher
paying public sector, captured by the term g in (16); second, they will less likely enter the private
sector, captured by the term −
h
p2 +( 1− p)
2
i
β in (16). The direct eﬀects are positive since
g −
h
p2 +( 1− p)
2
i
β = g − [p +( 1− p)(1− 2p)]β >g− pβ > 0,
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 3. However, the negative indirect eﬀect resulting
from the feedback of the increase in ρ on the equilibrium skill investment behavior of the workers in
the private sector, captured by the term −2p(1 − p)β in (16) more than oﬀsets the positive direct
eﬀects. One can similarly understand why W0 (Ω+ (ρ),ρ) can also decrease in ρ.
To satisfy the condition pβ <g<4p(1 − p)β in Proposition 6, the precision of the test signal
p h a st ob el e s st h a n3/4. That the precision in the signal cannot be too high for the equilibrium
eﬀects to dominate should be intuitive: A beneﬁcial net eﬀect from being excluded from the public
sector can only occur if the informational free riding problem in the private sector is severe enough,
and the higher is p the less severe this problem is.
Proposition 6 shows that it is possible that wages for both qualiﬁed and unqualiﬁed workers
decline in the probability of public sector employment. However, for Pareto comparisons we must
take into consideration that when ρ changes from 0 to a positive value, some workers switch from
being qualiﬁed to being unqualiﬁed, saving on the skill investment cost. But, these workers had
the option not to invest when ρ =0 , so by their revealed preference, the decrease in their expected
welfare, taking into account the change in their skill investment behavior, must be larger than those
who do not invest both before and after the change in ρ. We have thus proved the following:
15Proposition 7 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, if moreover pβ <g<4p(1 − p)β, then all workers
are economically worse oﬀ when ρ is positive but small than when ρ =0 .
D. Equilibrium with ρ > 0:G l o b a lA n a l y s i s
In this section, we maintain Assumption 1 that J is Uniform CDF on [0,1], but dispense with
Assumptions 2 and 3. We show that the general message conveyed in Section 4.C. is still valid.
First when ρ =0 , we can ﬁnd the unique non-trivial equilibrium, if it exists, directly by solving
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q
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Note that Ω+ (0) given by the expression (18) is always less than 1, but to guarantee that it is
positive, it must be the case that β >p(1 − p)/(2p − 1)
2 , conﬁrming Proposition 3.
When ρ > 0, in general the incentive function I (·,ρ) given by (6) may not be globally concave
in π, but we know that for ρ > 0, any non-trivial equilibrium must be smaller than Ω+ (0) by the
same argument as in the proof of Proposition 4.
If we further assume that Ω+ (0) < ˆ πh where Ω+ (0) and ˆ πh are respectively given by (18) and
(3), then arguments analogous to those in the proof of Proposition 5 can show that there exists
a unique non-trivial equilibrium if and only if ρ < 1 − p(1 − p)/(2p − 1)
2 β. We summarize the
above discussion as:
Proposition 8 Suppose that an economy e satisﬁes Assumption 1. For any ρ > 0, if Ω+ (0) < ˆ πh
holds where Ω+ (0) and ˆ πh are respectively given by (18) and (3), then there exists a unique non-
trivial equilibrium if and only if ρ < 1 − p(1 − p)/(2p − 1)
2 β.
The condition Ω+ (0) < ˆ πh plays the role of Assumption 2 in Section 4.C. (in fact, if Ω+ (0) =
1/2, the assumption Ω+ (0) < ˆ πh reduces to the condition g>p β). In general, it requires that
g>
Ω+ (0)pβ
[1 − Ω+ (0)](1 − p)+Ω+ (0)p
.
Though the above inequality looks rather complicated once one takes into account that Ω+ (0) is
given by (18), it involves only the primitives of the economy.
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Again it can be readily veriﬁed that if we plug in ρ =0in the expression Ω+ (ρ) above, we
immediately get the expression Ω+ (0) in (18). Since (19) fully characterizes the unique equilibrium
for any ρ > 0 for economies satisfying the condition Ω+ (0) < ˆ πh, we can in principle proceed as in
Section 4.C. at this point.
Not surprisingly, it is impractical to try to get analytical results from (19), but the following
numerical example demonstrates that the main result of Section 4.C. is robust. Set β =3 ,p=0 .73,
and g =2 .5. When ρ =0 , we can numerically calculate that in the unique non-trivial equilibrium
Ω+ (0) = 0.61 and the private sector wage for workers with high signal wh (Ω+ (0)) = 2.43, and
wl (Ω+ (0)) = 1.1, and ˆ πh =0 .65.
It can be easily veriﬁed that all the conditions in Proposition 8 are satisﬁed. Hence we use the
formula given by (19) to calculate the non-trivial equilibrium when ρ is positive. We then plot the
expected wages of qualiﬁed and unqualiﬁed workers in the non-trivial equilibrium associated with
diﬀerent levels of ρ according to (15). Figure 3 and 4 demonstrate that indeed, the expected wage
for qualiﬁed and unqualiﬁed workers are both declining as ρ increase provided that ρ is not too
large. By continuity, this guarantees that there is an open set of economies in which positive but
small probability of public sector jobs make every worker economically worse oﬀ in the subset of
economies satisfying Assumption 1.
E. Summary
In this section, we have shown that giving a group preferential access to high paying public sector
jobs dampens the incentives for skill investment valuable in the private sector. If the informational
free riding problem in the private labor is suﬃciently severe, it is possible that the adverse indirect
eﬀect due to the exacerbated informational free riding may dominate the favorable direct eﬀects.
Throughout the section we have assumed that the skill investment costs in the population follows
a Uniform distribution. The main role of this assumption is that the investment incentive function
I (π,ρ) is identical (or proportional) to the composite map J ◦I. It is clear that any distribution J
such that J ◦ I has curvature similar to that depicted in Figure 2 will deliver qualitatively similar
results.







Figure 3: Expected Wage for Qualiﬁed Workers as a Function of ρ: β =3 ,p=0 .73,g=2 .5.








Figure 4: Expected Wage of Unqualiﬁed Workers as a Function of ρ : β =3 ,p=0 .73,g=2 .5.
18The most crucial assumption is that ρ cannot be too high: given that the public sector by
assumption pays a higher wage than the private sector, if the government could set ρ =1 ,t h e no f
c o u r s et h ep r e f e r r e dg r o u pa saw h o l ew i l lb em a d eb e t t e ro ﬀ economically.
We believe that a small ρ is not an unreasonable assumption. In Southeast Asian countries, for
example, the native majority started to give themselves preferential treatment in the public sector
after their independence in the 1950s (see Sowell 1990). However, there was a natural capacity
constraint in the number of public sector positions, hence not every applicant could be given a job.
5T h e E ﬀects of Discriminatory Policy May be Large
In Section 4 we have shown that giving a group preferential access to the public sector jobs may
make them economically worse oﬀ. Here we demonstrate that it is possible to construct economies
in which that the magnitude of the adverse eﬀects on the preferentially treated group is actually
quite large.
To construct such examples in the simplest possible fashion, we maintain Assumption 2 in
Section 4.C.. Furthermore, we assume that the distribution of the skill investment cost c in the
population is Uniform on the interval [a,1 − a] where 0 ≤ a<1/2.
The equation characterizing non-trivial equilibria in this environment is:
π =
(1 − ρ) · I (π,0) − a
1 − 2a
. (20)
Claim 1 Under Assumption 2, when ρ =0 , the unique non-trivial equilibrium is 1/2 for any
a ∈ (0,1/2).
Proof. Note that under Assumption 2, 1/2 is the equilibrium when ρ =0and a =1 , hence
I (1/2,0) = 1/2. Plug this into the right hand side of (20) we obtain 1/2. Hence 1/2 is a non-trivial
equilibrium for any a ∈ (0,1/2) when ρ =0 . The uniqueness follows from the strictly concavity of
I (·,0).
Now let ρ > 0. Suppose that there is a non-trivial equilibrium, the same argument as that in
the proof of Proposition 4 shows that it must be less than 1/2. Hence it must be that for some





then there exists no π0 ∈ (0,1/2) such that (1 − ρ)I (π0,0) >a .T h e r e f o r ew eh a v et h ef o l l o w i n g
claim:
19Claim 2 Fix ρ ∈ (0,1). The unique equilibrium of all economies satisfying Assumptions 2 and 3
is the trivial equilibrium if a ∈ ((1 − ρ)/2,1/2).
What Claims 1 and 2 have shown is that for any ρ > 0 we can ﬁnd a set of economies in which
the unique equilibrium is the trivial no-investment equilibrium, while for an identical economy if ρ
is instead set to 0, there exists a unique non-trivial equilibrium at 1/2.
We now compare the a v e r a g ee c o n o m i cs u r p l u sin the maximal equilibrium (i.e. the equilibrium
with the maximal element in Ω(e)) for these economies under ρ =0and ρ > 0. We index the
equilibrium average economic surplus by ρ and write it as U (ρ).
When ρ =0 , in the non-trivial equilibrium of economies satisfying conditions of Claim 2, half
of the workers draw high signals and obtain a wage wh (1/2) = pβ and half of the workers draw low
signals and obtain a wage wl (1/2) = (1 − p)β. At this equilibrium the average economic surplus,


















When ρ > 0, if we choose a to be in the interval of ((1 − ρ)/2,1/2), then by Claim 2, the
economy will only admit a trivial equilibrium. Hence no one invests and a proportion ρ of the
population earns g and the remaining earns 0. The average economic surplus is







Let K (ρ)=U (0)/U (ρ),t h a ti s ,
K (ρ)=
4β − (1 + 2a)
8ρg
.
K (ρ) denotes the ratio the average economic surplus of the discriminated group over the preferred
group. We now ask the following question: what is the upper-bound of K, denoted by ¯ K, for
diﬀerent levels of ρ if we impose all the restrictions that are required for the validity of Claims 1
and 2? This upper-bound can inform us about the extent of the wealth diﬀerentials between the
discriminated minority and the preferred majority that can be rationalized by the economic forces
highlighted in this paper. The ﬁrst restriction is that a ∈ ((1 − ρ)/2,1/2); the second restriction
comes from Assumption 3, i.e., g>p β and the third comes from Assumption 2, (2p − 1)



























.01 2 9 . 43 7 . 63 7 . 53 6 . 33 4 . 93 3 . 63 2 . 43 1 . 33 0 . 3
.06 5.03 6.31 6.28 6.06 5.83 5.61 5.40 5.22 5.05
.11 2.81 3.47 3.44 3.32 3.19 3.07 2.95 2.85 2.76
.16 1.98 2.41 2.38 2.29 2.20 2.11 2.03 1.96 1.90
.21 1.54 1.85 1.82 1.75 1.68 1.61 1.55 1.50 1.45
ρ .26 1.27 1.50 1.48 1.42 1.36 1.31 1.26 1.21 1.17
.31 1.09 1.27 1.25 1.20 1.14 1.10 1.06 1.02 0.98
.36 0.96 1.10 1.08 1.03 0.99 0.95 0.91 0.88 0.85
.41 0.86 0.98 0.95 0.91 0.87 0.83 0.80 0.77 0.75
.46 0.78 0.88 0.85 0.81 0.78 0.74 0.72 0.69 0.67
.51 0.72 0.80 0.77 0.74 0.70 0.67 0.65 0.62 0.60
Table 2: The Value of ¯ K for Combinations of ρ and β.
Hence, subject to the assumption that the skill investment cost c is distributed as a Uniform
distribution, the upper-bound of wage diﬀerential between the discriminated minority and the








I nT a b l e2 ,w ec a l c u l a t et h ev a l u e so f ¯ K for diﬀerent combinations of β and ρ. These numbers
demonstrate that our model is consistent with a Southeast Asian phenomenon where the discrimi-
nated Chinese minority is economically substantially more successful than native majority. Table
2 also reveals two interesting features of ¯ K : ﬁrst, for a ﬁxed β, it decreases with ρ; second, for any
ρ, it ﬁrst increases, then decreases with β.
A model as simple as ours can’t be expected to explain which groups will suﬀer and which
groups will be successful under government-mandated discrimination. Having said that, we ﬁnd
it interesting to note that ρ is a key parameter that determines how much better or worse oﬀ the
discriminated group can be in equilibrium. This is interesting, because ρ can be thought of as
representing the extent of the labor market the government can control with legislation. While we
don’t know how to quantify it, it seems that the exclusionary policies in southeastern Asia was







wl ˆ wl wh ˆ wh g
[π(1 − p)+( 1− π)p](1− ρ)
ˆ π(1 − p)+( 1− ˆ π)p
1 − ρ
1
Figure 5: The Cumulative Densities of the Income Distributions.
(large ρ).
Table 2 informs us whether the discriminated group can be better oﬀ than the preferred group
under diﬀerent parameter conﬁgurations. The average surplus for the discriminated group is (at
best) less than that of the preferred group when either ρ is substantial (over .36, for example) or β
is suﬃciently high. The reason that when ρ is substantial, the preferred group is going to do better
is simply that we have assumed in calculating these bounds that the public sector pays more than
the highest wage in the private sector, i.e., g>p β.6
6 Discussion: Two Implications of the Model
Our model predicts that income inequality among the preferred majority will increase following
the adoption of preferential policies. Figure 5 depicts the cumulative density of the income distrib-
utional for ρ =0and ρ > 0, where the hatted variables are for the case ρ =0 . It demonstrates that
t h ei n c o m ed i s t r i b u t i o nw h e nρ =0ﬁrst order stochastically dominates that when ρ > 0, which
implies that the Gini Index in the preferred majority increases following the preferential policy.
This implication is supported by the evidence in Malaysia. Sowell (1990, P. 48), citing the
study by Puthucheary (1983), stated that: “Income inequality among Malays increased under
preferential policies, with the income share of the top 10 percent rising from 42 percent to 53
6The reason that when β is suﬃciently high, the preferred group does better is less interesting. The Table maintains
Assumption 2, (2p − 1)
2 β =1 /2. Hence, the comparative static comes from the fact that the precision in the test
signal is reduced as β increases.
22percent of all income received by Malays.” This pattern, as Sowell stated, was “by no means
conﬁned to Malaysia.”
Second, our model provides an alternative explanation to the experience of overseas Japanese
on the mainland U.S. and Hawaii. As Sowell (1996, P. 119) states: “Ironically, the Japanese on
the mainland, who historically faced more discrimination, as well as wartime internment, achieved
higher incomes and occupational levels than those in Hawaii. The Japanese in Hawaii were also
much more active politically, and by 1971 had a majority in the state legislature.” Sowell explains
this phenomenon through immigration selection: “Historically, the Japanese who immigrated to
Hawaii came from poorer regions and poorer classes in Japan than did those who went to the U.S.
mainland,” but he failed to explain why such a pattern of immigration selection emerged. This
phenomenon, however, arises naturally in our model.
7C o n c l u s i o n
Some minorities, notably overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia and Jews in Europe, have per-
formed economically better than the native majorities, despite being subject to government-mandated
discriminatory policies. We provide a simple explanation based on the incentive eﬀects generated
by preferential policies, which we think complements the most commonly invoked explanations
based on immigration selection and cultural diﬀerences.
We study an economy with private and public sectors in which workers invest in imperfectly
observable skills that are important to the private sector but not to the public sector. A law
allows the native majority to be employed in the public sector while excluding the minority from it.
Even when the public sector oﬀers the highest wage rate, it is still possible that the discriminated
group, on average, is economically more successful. The reason is that the preferential policy will
indirectly lower the majority’s incentive to invest in imperfectly observable skills by exacerbating
the informational free riding problem in the private sector labor market.
The model also has other testable implications. For example, following the adoption of prefer-
ential policies, the income inequality among the preferred group will increase, which is consistent
with empirical observations from Malaysia and other Southeast Asian countries.
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